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ABSTRACT
This project implements a Multi-Level Security (MLS) lattice model
framework based on a graph database by creating and testing the the BellLaPadula access control environment within it. The graph database (Neo4j) is
used as a tool to implement MLS policy by leveraging Bell-LaPadula security
principles and the MLS lattice model. After verifying that the MLS lattice model is
correctly expressed in the graph database, a formal framework in which BellLaPadula security principles is applied to track the information flow within a
single domain. Finally, we extend and enhance the formal framework so that a
MLS security access control policy can be specified for the MLS multi-domain
environment. With the new enhanced model, we are able to perform a query to
verify if the subject in one domain can access to the object in another domain
while the two domains are connected through a trust relationship.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Research Motivation
Information security remains as a critical component not only for private
sectors but government as well. This is evident by examining the grave effects on
cases such as the breach that happened to Marriott (Sanger et al., 2018) as well
as the US Office of Personnel Management (Davis, 2015; Koerner, 2016) and the
interference of the presidential election in 2016 (“2016 Presidential Campaign
Hacking Fast Facts”, 2019). To protect the distributed systems from attacks such
as these in the government, cybersecurity professionals rely heavily on detailed
security standards, policy, and guidelines. Furthermore these standards, policies,
and guidelines, such as the ones in the Risk Management Framework, are
mandated by the E-Government Act (2002), Federal Information Security
Management Act (2002), and Federal Information Security Modernization Act
(2014) as there is a need to develop baseline for government work processes
and systems (Ross et al., 2020).
Besides the Risk Management Framework that is adopted throughout the
federal government, the public sector also utilizes Multi-Level Security (MLS)
policies in order to only enable authorized personnel, systems, or processes to
access the resources that are deemed sensitive. To fully utilize MLS policy,
access control principles must be utilized known as the Bell-LaPadula (BLP) may
be utilized. A lattice model by (Denning, 1976) represents such policies in an
9

abstracted view through vertices and edges and we are aware of the existence of
the graph database that may take advantage of such structure. Therefore, these
questions came to mind:
•

Can the MLS policies be expressed in a graph database?

•

Can information leaks be identified through the graph database?

•

Can we query if one subject can access another object in another
domain?

•

What are possible byproducts of this research?
According to Cram et al., 2017, the overall quality of the policy is

influenced by its brevity (e.g., length), clarity (e.g., ease of understanding), and
breadth (e.g., level of guidance on violation ramification), leading us to believe
that the security policies may be liable to be interpreted differently from the
writer’s original intentions. Even a weakness in one the three mentioned
categories may present a difficulty when it comes time to implement the policies
when it is viewed by security practitioners which may lead to an information leak.
Such important policies may be represented visually to provide a common
ground for security policy writers and security practitioners using a graph
database.

10

Organization
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In chapter 2, literature
and concepts studied in the past are reviewed. Chapter 3 implements the MLS
lattice model and explore potentials in the graph database. Chapter 4 presents
how information leaks may be identified between MLS multiple domains with a
pre-defined information sharing agreement by leveraging BLP security principles
in the database. Chapter 5 shows our extended framework which allows us to
verify if the subject in one domain can access to the object in another domain in
a MLS cross-domain environment. Chapter 6 contains the conclusion and future
work.
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CHAPTER TWO
BACKGROUND

Multi-Level Security
The Bell-LaPadula (BLP) Model is used to address Multi-Level Security
(MLS) and Mandatory Access Control (MAC). MAC (Examples 1 & 2) is a method
on limiting the access of an object from a subject, based on the sensitivity of the
data along with a need-to-know requirement. There is also the BLP Model (Bell,
2005) which restricts the flow of information to only flow upwards from a lower
security label to a higher security label to mitigate compromising confidentiality of
the information Panossian, 2019. A past research has been conducted to formally
render Multi-Level Security (MLS) structure as a lattice model (Denning, 1976)
shown in Figure 2.1 which specifies the BLP properties. The MLS is used widely
from the federal departments in the United States government as well as thirdparty defense contracting industries to allow access to sensitive information
(Panossian, 2019). The lattice model’s structure is formed with vertices
connected by edges. Figure 2.1 also distinguished two sets of vertices with
different colors by their levels. Vertices that cover the red area are labeled as top
secret or “TS” and vertices that cover the orange area are labeled as secret or
“S”.
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Figure 2.1: Lattice Model
Security labels (𝑆𝐿(𝑆𝑖 , 𝐶𝑖 )) consist of two components. The first
component is a sensitivity level (Example 1). Sensitivity level has a range from
“Unclassified” to “Classified” to “Secret” and “Top Secret” and countries and
organizations have a similar hierarchy structures which are associated by the risk
of the information being exposed (Focardi & Gorrieri, 2003).

Example 1. Based on Figure 2.1, TS {} is a considered a higher classification
than S {} or TS {} ≥ S {}. Therefore, TS {} is able to read from S {} and S {} can
write to TS {}, allowing information to flow from a lower classification to a higher
classification. At the same time, TS {} cannot write down to S {} nor can S {} read
up to TS {}, for this would allow information to flow in reverse. The
implementation rules are discussed are portrayed in Figure 2.2 (Denning, 1976;
Panossian, 2019).
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The second component is based on the need-to-know component (c)
known as compartments (Example 2). Every sensitivity level will be associated
with a set of compartments to detail the security label an entity has in
possession.

Example 2. Based on Figure 2.1, TS {} cannot read from or write to S {Nuke}.
Although the Top Secret classification (TS {}) is higher than the Secret
classification (S {Nuke}) similar to Example 1, TS {} does not have the need to
know as it lacks the {Nuke} compartment. This is the second criteria that needs
to be formally satisfied as SL(Si,Ci) ⊇ SL(Sj,Ck), which is not satisfied in this
example. By creating compartments, such as {Nuke} or {Bio}, access becomes
much more restrictive, as if there is another layer of security. Simply having the
highest security clearance will not grant a user access to everything (Denning,
1976; Panossian, 2019).

With the two components, there is a criteria each component must
indefinitely satisfy for two objects to be comparable and decide one set of
security label to dominate the other security label SL(Si,Ci) ≥SL SL(sj, ck)
(Focardi & Gorrieri, 2003; Son, 2008). Such labels such as SL(Si,Cj) is
interchangeable with SL(TS {Bio,Chem}) or SL(TS, {Bio,Chem}).In order to
provide one security label dominates another is if and only if SL(Si) ≥SL SL(Sj)
and SL(Ci) ⊇SL SL(Cj), however, if SL(Ci) is {} then it could be just considered as
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SL(Si) or Si. When the two are compared and the relationship between the two
objects are proven, BLP security conditions are applied to complete the multilevel security concept which is represented in the lattice model.
In order for the two security labels to be comparable the two criteria
implied on MAC must be met as shown above (Examples 1 & 2). However, to
prevent information from leaking, the two security properties from the BLP
models need to be met. Those two essential security properties are: simple
security property and star property. Together the two properties ensure
information flows from low to high (Figure 2.2). The security policies are built
around the concept of subjects (s) and objects (o).

Figure 2.2: Information Flow with BLP
Simple security property Simultaneously known as the “no read up” states that
a subject with a security label may not read an object with a comparably higher
security label. In other words, a subject (s) may read object (o) if the security
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label (SL) of the object is less than or equal to the level of the subject (Bell,
2005).
SL(s) ≥SL SL(o)

Example 3. Assuming a person (s) has the security clearance S {Bio}, si cannot
read oi (with the classification TS {Bio, Nuke}), as the security classification for oi
is higher than the clearance si has. However, si can read the object o j (with the
classification S {Bio}), as SL(si) ≥SL SL(oj). Furthermore, person A should also
be able to read ok (with the classification S {}).

(star) property

Simultaneously known as the “no write down” states that a

subject with a given security level may not write to any objects with a lower
security level. Therefore, the subject (s) may write to the object (o) if the security
label (SL) of the subject is less than or equal to the level of the object (Bell,
2005).
SL(s) ≤SL SL(o)

Example 4. Assuming every variable has the same security label as shown in
Example 3, person (si) can now write to oi, as the security classification is higher
than person A’s clearance. However, person A will not be able to write to o j as
well as ok, due to o j and ok having a lower security classification compared to
the security label si has.
16

Multi-Level Security Modeling Using a Graph Database

The concept of graphs dates all the way back to the early 18th century,
where Leohard Euler set the groundwork for the mathematics and graph theory
(Needham & Hodler, 2019). While graphs originated in mathematics, graphs are
pragmatic tools to model and analyze data. A graph consists of two elements:
vertices and edges. Connecting two vertices representing an entity with an edge
will form a graphical relationship as shown in Figure 2.3. The simple graph
shown in Figure 2.3 can form a couple sentences that provide the intended
information. By observing Figure 2.3, it is possible to convey the graph into an
information “John drives the blue car that his employer, the MLS Company,
provides him.” A simple pragmatic concept such as this increases the potential of
a graph database in designing and expressing access control models. The
design itself focuses on relationships and it does not utilize any expensive JOIN
operations that SQL database utilizes to compute relationships (Sasaki, 2018).
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Figure 2.3: A Graph Database Example

Neo4j: Nodes, Relationships, and Graph Algorithms

Neo4j is a graph database that supports transactional and analytical
processsing of graph data (Needham & Hodler, 2019). It was selected because it
uses an easy to learn ASCII based commands and comes with integrated tools
that provides effective access different uses. In Neo4j, the two essential
elements that make a graph are represented as nodes (vertices) and
relationships (edges) in the database. In graph database models, nodes store
data about an object while relationships convey data about the relevance
between the two objects. Labels and attributes are another construct that Neo4j
utilizes to build more precise models. Graph databases enable grouping of the
nodes and clarification of relationships through labels. Attributes are used to
detail or uniquely identify the nodes and to add numerical measures on a
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relationship. The four constructs mentioned could build a comprehensive model
to mention details that may be missed out on abstract diagrams.
There is one constraint when developing a model, all relationships are
unidirectional therefore the direction of the relationship must be specified,
however, a bidirectional relationship could be conveyed through a symmetric
relationship. A case study by Noel et al., 2016 portrayed a similar relationship
utilizing a symmetric relationship when identifying the security postures of
networked systems. According to Crawford, 2016, in order for two arbitrary node
x and y, with the sorted pairs of (x, y) and (y,x) the direction of the relationship
could be oriented in two different directions. For example, when attempting to
convey an established trust relationship that we see in two different domains in
Figure 2.4, Dx labels the relationship to Dy as [:TRUSTS] in Figure 2.4 (a) and the
same relationship could be conveyed back by labeling Dy to have the [: T RU
STS] relationship as system Dx as shown in Figure 2.4(b). By adding examples of
(a) and (b), a symmetric [:TRUSTS] relationship can be formed between node Dx
and Dy shown in Figure 2.4(c) to represent two nodes trusting each other.

Figure 2.4: Examples of Directed Graphs

The Neo4j database comes with built in algorithms to analyze graphical
representation of physical models. The three algorithms used are path finding,
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centrality, and community detection algorithm (Needham & Hodler, 2019). After
use cases of each algorithms are explored, one algorithm is experimented with
the database: path finding algorithm. Path finding algorithm is built on top of a
graph search algorithm in the database. Path finding algorithms are utilized to
identify optimal routes in a graph which requires quantitative values to be
assigned to each relationship. Without such quantitative value on relationships,
path finding algorithm could not be fully utilized but an alternative search and log
query was generated which was originally intended to store results a minimum
spanning tree algorithm. The custom query will be utilized in Chapter 3 to
observe all paths within the MLS lattice model.

Utilization of Graph Database for Access Control Modeling

Graph databases have been researched mainly in Role-Based Access
Control (RBAC) models (Alves & Fernández, 2017; Wahane, 2017; Morgado et al.,
2018; Jin & Kaja, 2019). While there are few seminal works that utilize the MAC
model (Yixin Jiang etal., 2004; Crawford, 2016), this project used the seminal
work by Jin and Kaja, 2019, to formulate the problem. In the previous work’s
instance, access control was implemented specifying controls for a RBAC
through XACML using a graph database. By pre-defining access control in
XACML, it allowed explicit access control decisions to be presentedin a graph
database. An XACML implementation was indicated to be one approach to
enforcing the read and write rules within the MLS Lattice structure. However,

20

XACML is not needed to produce an induced relationship between nodes in a
MLS lattice model. Producing a graph-based access control framework on
several well-known access control models (MAC, DAC, RBAC) was also
researched by (Koch et al., 2005) which also helped model relationships between
the MLS model and entities that are bound to the model. Graph database has
also been utilized to research network attack relationships utilizing various
sources of aggregated data by (Noel et al., 2016).

XACML and Graph Database

This architecture allows to form an induced

relationship between nodes that are indirectly connected relationships through
traversing relationships and constraints defined through XACML. The concept
pairs well with organizations with no need for an abstract structure between a
subject and an object. When a subject requests access to an object, the path is
queried through the database, but the policy written in XACML compares the
constraints set on the object with the subject’s attributes and then decides to
grant or deny access to the object (Figure2.5). One disadvantage to this
implementation is that all the different combination of attributes in subject to
object access and the change in the entities’ attribute in different times must be
accounted for.

21

Logistics

XACML:
Granted

Figure 2.5: Example XACML Based Implementation

Example 5. Assuming a person (si) node in Figure 2.5 had an attribute with a
“Department: Research” and requests access to an object (Files) which belongs
to another research node (oi) and an initial policy in XACML grants access to
everyone in the research department. Therefore, since the attributes do match,
the request to access the object belonging to the research department will be
permitted and an induced relationship is formed where the subject can access
files belonging to the research department.

Example 6. Assuming the same person (si) node in Figure 2.5 had an attribute
with a “Department: Research” and requests access to a file (o j) which belongs
to another department (Logistics) and a policy in XACML denies access to
everyone in the not within the logistics department. Therefore, since the
attributes do not match, the request to access the object belonging to the
research department will be denied and no relationship is formed between the
subject (Person) node and object (Logistics) node.

22

CHAPTER THREE
GRAPH DATABASE FOR SPECIFYING MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY LATTICE

Creation of Lattice Model Inside a Graph Database
This chapter will verify the usability of graph database to express MLS
through two experiments. Afterward, logs of the path it takes to present all
available paths within the MLS lattice model will be observed through a
supplemental Cypher query for path finding algorithms. Throughout the chapter
transitive properties will be applied to formally prove security label (a) will
dominate another security label (b) by traversing through pre-defined
relationships. The test will be conducted through the lattice model expressed in
the Neo4j graph database shown in Figure 3.1. To create this model, each
security label node was created with three attributes: UID, sensitivityLevel, and
Compartment. Furthermore, each node representing a security label has a onedirectional relationship pointing away, labeled as “[:DOMINATES]”, towards
another node to signify it has a higher security label than the other label. The
MLS model in Figure 3.1 was created with the Cypher.

•

Create Security Labels

CREATE (:Label {sensitivityLevel: ‘Top Secret’, compartment: ‘Bio, Nuke’, UID:
‘TS {Bio, Nuke}’}),
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(:Label {sensitivityLevel: ‘Top Secret’, compartment: ‘Bio’, UID: ‘TS {Bio}’}),
(:Label {sensitivityLevel: ‘Top Secret’, compartment: ‘Nuke’, UID: ‘TS {Nuke}’}),
(:Label {sensitivityLevel: ‘Top Secret’, compartment: ‘ ’, UID: ‘TS { }’}),
(:Label {sensitivityLevel: ‘Secret’, compartment: ‘Bio, Nuke’, UID: ‘S {Bio,
Nuke}’}),
(:Label {sensitivityLevel: ‘Secret’, compartment: ‘Bio’, UID: ‘S {Bio}’}),
(:Label {sensitivityLevel: ‘Secret’, compartment: ‘Nuke’, UID: ‘S {Nuke}’}),
(:Label {sensitivityLevel: ‘Secret’, compartment: ‘ ’, UID: ‘S { }’});

•

Create Relationship with Same Compartment and Lower Level of
Clearance

MATCH (h:Label {sensitivityLevel: ‘Top Secret’}), (l:Label { sensitivityLevel:
‘Secret’})
WHERE h.compartment = l.compartment CREATE (h)-[rel:DOMINATES]->(l);

•

Create Relationship with Subset of Compartments

MATCH (h:Label {sensitivityLevel: ‘Top Secret’, compartment: ‘Bio, Nuke’}),
(l:Label {sensitivityLevel: ‘Top Secret’})
WHERE l.compartment = ‘Bio’ or l.compartment = ‘Nuke’ CREATE (h)[rel:DOMINATES]->(l);
MATCH (h:Label {sensitivityLevel: ‘Top Secret’}),(l:Label {sensitivityLevel: ‘Top
Secret’, compartment: ‘ ’})
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WHERE h.compartment = ‘Bio’ or h.compartment = ‘Nuke’ CREATE (h)[rel:DOMINATES]->(l);
MATCH (h:Label {sensitivityLevel: ‘Secret’, compartment: ‘Bio, Nuke’}), (l:Label
{sensitivityLevel: ‘Secret’})
CREATE (h)-[rel:DOMINATES]->(l);
MATCH (h:Label {sensitivityLevel: ‘Secret’}),(l:Label {sensitivityLevel: ‘Secret’,
compartment: ‘ ’})
CREATE (h)-[rel:DOMINATES]->(l);
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Figure 3.1: MLS Model in Graph Database
The following two test scenarios involve Cypher queries with an explicitly
defined destination that are utilized to verify if the lattice model is correctly
represented in the graph database. Furthermore, an example utilizing a
supplemental query used to log the paths in path finding algorithms to explain the
dominating relationships between the security labels will be observed in the next
section to supplement the statements made in this section.
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Scenario 1 (Comparable Security Labels)
The following test scenario queries paths with a set destination which
satisfies the two criteria in order for two security label in a MLS structure to be
comparable, SL(Si,Ci) ≥ SL(Sj,Ck) and SL(Si,Ci) ⊇ SL(Sj,Cj). In this test, the
following Cypher query has been utilized to provide the result in Figure 3.2.
MATCH path=(h:Label {UID: 'TS_{Bio}'})-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label {UID: 'S_{ }'})
RETURN path;

Figure 3.2: Comparable Query Result
In this instance of the Cypher query, it rendered the path from TS {Bio}
node to S {} node, which provide two paths it took to reach the final node. While
the query satisfies both criteria demonstrated from Example 1 and Example 2,
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the test showed that TS {Bio} is a higher classification than S {} by implying the
transitive property. Transitive Property holds:
SL(Si,Ci) ≥SL SL(Sj,Cj) and SL(Sj,Cj) ≥SL SL(Sk,Ck) ⇒
SL(Si,Ci) ≥SL SL(Sk,Ck)
In this test, TS {Bio} did not indicate that the node was directly a higher
classification, but it indicated its dominance through the TS {} and S {Bio} nodes.
Therefore, this test confirmed TS {Bio} ≥ S {} through graph traversal in the
database. Since the two security labels are comparable, BLP security conditions
are satisfied in this comparison.Therefore, subjects with TS {Bio} will be able to
read down to objects with TS {}, S {Bio}, and S {}. Additionally, subjects with
S {} can write up to objects with S {Bio}, TS {}, and TS {Bio}.
Scenario 2 (Incomparable Security Labels)
The following test scenario queries paths with a set destination which
satisfies only one criteria (Si ≥ S j), while dissatisfying the other criteria (Si f}_ S j);
which should result in two security labels in the MLS structure to be
incomparable. In this test, the following Cypher query was utilized but no results
were returned (Figure 3.3).
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Figure 3.3: Incomparable Query Result

In this instance of the Cypher query, it attempted to query paths from TS
{Bio} to TS {Nuke}. From observing the Figure 3.3, the graph database
determined there was no logical path to reach from TS {Bio} to TS {Nuke},
therefore it ran the query but there was no graphical output. This, however,
indicates a good sign. This test ensures no technical security violation to occur
when comparing MAC criteria inside the graph database’s MLS model. Since the
two security labels are incomparable, the BLP security conditions can not be
applied. Therefore, the subjects with a TS {Bio} cannot read or write to objects
with TS {Nuke} nor can subjects with TS {Nuke} be able to read or write to
objects with TS {Bio}.

Observing All Paths within Graphical MLS
Graph databases allow queries to render the shortest path by utilizing the
path finding algorithm, which can be installed as a plug-in. However, since the
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default path finding algorithm requires a numerical weight on the relationship to
display the shortest path, a custom query was required. Two queries can be
performed to observe how a graph traverses through relationships in this case. A
query can be performed to display all nodes that a T S {Bio, Nuke} node
dominates in the database, which will output the same image as Figure 3.1.
Another query can be performed to log all the source and destination node while
traversing to its final destination, which was also intended to compliment the path
finding algorithm. To better supplement the statements in Test Scenario 2 and
observe how the database makes its inference with the MLS structure
(Figure3.4), the secondary query will be performed.

MATCH path=(h:Label {UID: 'TS_{Bio, Nuke}'})-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label) WITH
relationships(path) AS rels UNWIND rels AS rel with DISTINCT rel AS rel
Return startNODE(rel).UID AS source, endNODE(rel).UID AS destination;
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Figure 3.4: All Logical Paths

The custom query requested the database to output all the nodes which
the T S {Bio, Nuke} can reach. Furthermore, the query requested logs of the
source and destination node to be displayed as query traverses in the graph. By
analyzing Figure 3.4, it is shows on how the node with the highest security label
reaches the lowest security label through different paths. Additionally, query can
be seen going back to the point where there was a split point to reach another
destination. After observing the logs, no paths were shown where a lower
security label dominated a higher label or two pairs of security labels becoming
associated with one another through transitive property. This conclusion confirms
that policies could be enforced and queried through the database. Instead of
relying on another mark up language to explicitly specify the rules, the rules
could be adopted and visualized through the database.
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Verification of MLS Structure with BLP Policy
After observing the compliance with the MAC criterias in the database,
BLP security policies were explicitly enforced. During the assignment process, it
was realized that the graph database can make a logical inference with the MLS
lattice model (Figure 3.5). When attempting to create relationships, the
relationships were made individually and in compliance with the MAC criterias
from the source node with the destination nodes. The Cypher command
(Example 7) was written to make a [:CAN READ] relationship from a higher
security label to a lower security label that had a “DOMINATES” relationship
starting from the T S {Bio, Nuke} node. To verify the logical inference made with
MLS has maintained the integrity of the design to only allow compartments with a
need to know basis, a second Cypher statement was generated in Example 8.
After the tests were conducted, the database applied all read and write policies
and served as a granular MLS auditing tool for at least a single domain.

EXAMPLE 7.
MATCH path = (h:Label {UID: 'TS_(Bio, Nuke)'})-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label)
CREATE (h)-[:CAN_READ]->(l);
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Figure 3.5: Proof of Logical Inference

The TS {Bio, Nuke} was expected to make an indirect relationships
through establishing [:CAN READ] relationship with the TS {Bio} node, then the
TS {Bio} node to make a [:CAN READ] relationship with the S {Bio} in the order
of TS {Bio, Nuke} > TS {Bio} S {Bio}. However, TS {Bio, Nuke} has made a direct
connection, where it can also count the number of paths to reach the S {} node.
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Example 8.
MATCH path = (h:Label {UID: 'TS_(Bio, Nuke)'})-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label)
CREATE (h)-[:CAN_READ]->(l);

Figure 3.5: Proof of Logical Inference

For this example, A match and create statement was used, similar to
Example 7. For this instance, however, it was to observe whether the database
will create [:CAN READ] relationship with another security label. This match and
create statement start from the TS {Bio} node to observe whether it created the
read down relationship with incomparable nodes or observe violation of the
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simple security model (BLP: no read up) such as TS {Bio, Nuke}, TS {Nuke}, S
{Bio, Nuke} or S {Nuke}. As it shows in Figure 3.6, no violations were observed
and the integrity of the MLS and BLP policies were maintained.

MLS Graph with BLP Implementation in Single Domain
After verifying the MLS structure can properly apply access control policy
through applying the the simple security property, the star security property of
BLP was applied in the MLS Model in the database. The following is the Cypher
command used to generate the full implementation of BLP security principles
expressed in the graph database (Figure 3.7). The inferred relationships shown in
Figure 3.7 represented in the database as a [CAN READ] or [CAN WRITE], also
indicates the possibility of subjects and objects to directly make read and write
relationships when attached to the model. This will allow the database to formally
map access control policies in an intra-domain environment and an evidence of
autonomy when another domain is attached to this model.
•

Implement Simple Security Property

MATCH path = (h:Label {UID: ‘TS {Bio, Nuke}’})-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label)
CREATE (h)-[:CAN READ]->(l);
MATCH path = (h:Label {UID: ‘TS {Bio}’})-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label)
CREATE (h)-[:CAN READ]->(l);
MATCH path = (h:Label {UID: ‘TS {Nuke}’})-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label)
CREATE (h)-[:CAN READ]->(l);
MATCH path = (h:Label {UID: ‘TS { }’})-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label)
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CREATE (h)-[:CAN READ]->(l);
MATCH path = (h:Label {UID: ‘S {Bio, Nuke}’})-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label)
CREATE (h)-[:CAN READ]->(l);
MATCH path = (h:Label {UID: ‘S {Bio}’})-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label)
CREATE (h)-[:CAN READ]->(l);
MATCH path = (h:Label {UID: ‘S {Nuke}’})-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label)
CREATE (h)-[:CAN READ]->(l);

•

Implement Star Security Property

MATCH path = (h:Label)-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label {UID: ‘S { }’})
CREATE (l)-[:CAN WRITE]->(h);
MATCH path = (h:Label)-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label {UID: ‘S {Bio}’})
CREATE (l)-[:CAN WRITE]->(h);
MATCH path = (h:Label)-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label {UID: ‘S {Nuke}’})
CREATE (l)-[:CAN WRITE]->(h);
MATCH path = (h:Label)-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label {UID:‘S {Bio, Nuke}’})
CREATE (l)-[:CAN WRITE]->(h);
MATCH path = (h:Label)-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label {UID: ‘TS { }’})
CREATE (l)-[:CAN WRITE]->(h);
MATCH path = (h:Label)-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label {UID: ‘TS {Bio}’})
CREATE (l)-[:CAN WRITE]->(h);
MATCH path = (h:Label)-[:DOMINATES*]->(l:Label {UID: ‘ {Nuke}’})
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CREATE (l)-[:CAN WRITE]->(h);

Figure 3.7: MLS with Applied BLP Principles
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CHAPTER FOUR
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN MULTI-DOMAIN MLS STRUCTURE

Information Flow Through Multi-Domains
For multiple domains to collaborate with one another (share and edit
confidential files), a mutual trust must be established. There are two steps to
establishing trust between multiple domains. The initial step is to identify and
specify the security labels that each domain will utilize to form a relationship
between the two domains. The following step is to agree upon the nature of the
trust between the two domains. Afterwards, security violations will be identified
from observing if a loop of information flow has been formalized through the trust
relationships. As a starting point, another domain (DCDC) was created to test
inter-domain collaboration test scenarios. For simplicity, the domains have been
abstracted and depicted in Figure 4.1. The group of objects in the left represent
the DCDC and the group of objects in the right represent the DArmy. Furthermore,
the information flow observed in the tests are used to identify information leaks
created from various [:DOMINATES] and various [:TRUSTS*] relationships
(Figure 4.2) in the graph.
In a single domain, information flow has an inverse relationship to the
[:DOMINATES] relationship in the graph. For example, if a higher security label
dominates a lower security label, the information flow will start from lower
security label and end in the higher security label. The result in Figure 4.1 was
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created by inputting a cypher statement which creates a information flow in
accordance with the [:DOMINATES] relationship:
MATCH (h:Label)-[:DOMINATES]->(l:Label)
CREATE (l)-[:INFORMATION FLOW]->(h);

Figure 4.1: Second Abstract Domain

The final step is to determine and agree upon the nature of the trust
(partial or full trust and one-way or two-way). This allows inter-domain mapping
and allow cooperation between two domains. In Figure 4.2, a matrix was
formulated to show the nature of trust a two domain can have in a one-way
relationship. Furthermore, the information flow of each one way trust has been
labeled in a green arrow based on the type of trust relationship. As it is shown in
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Figure 4.2, [:INFORMATION FLOW] relationship will be created accordingly with
how the [:TRUSTS*] relationships has been mapped in the multi-domain setting
in the database. The test scenarios are based on a prior work domain mapping
example by Panossian, 2019 and will analyze the flow of information to detect an
information leak.

Figure 4.2: One-Way Trust Matrix

Test Scenario 1 (One-Way Full Trust)
One-way, full trust (read/write) relationship was created in the graph
database to depict an incorrect inter-domain relationship (Figure 4.3) to observe
the information flow. As a result of this incorrect mapping:
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•

DArmy Unclassi f ied is able to read from DCDC High

•

DArmy Unclassie f ed is able to write to DCDC High

•

DArmy Top Secret is able to read from DCDC Low

•

DArmy Top Secret is able to write to DCDC Low
The following Cypher statement was utilized to simulate the inter-domain

relationships and information flows:
•

Incorrectly Map Relationship from DCDC High to DArmy Unclassified

MATCH (d1:Label {UID: ‘High’}), (d2:Label {UID: ‘Unclassified’})
CREATE (d1)-[:FULLY TRUSTS ONE WAY]->(d2);
•

Incorrectly Map Relationship from DCDC Low to DArmy Top Secret

MATCH (d1:Label {UID: ‘Low’}), (d2:Label {UID: ‘TS’})
CREATE (d1)-[:FULLY TRUSTS ONE WAY]->(d2);
•

Create Information Flow Between DCDC and DArmy by Utilizing The
Wrong Mapping

MATCH (d1:Label)-[:Fully TRUSTS ONE WAY]->(d2:Label)
CREATE (d1)-[:INFORMATION FLOW]->(d2), (d2)-[:INFORMATION FLOW]>(d1);
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Figure 4.3: Multi-Domain One-Way Full Trust

First Violation

First violation was identified through a query if an information

flow path exists from DArmy TS to DArmy Unclassi f ied and the path was logged to
identify how the violation was produced:
•

Find Path

MATCH path = (:Label{UID: ‘TS’})-[:INFORMATION FLOW*]->(:Label {UID:
‘Unclassified’})
RETURN path;
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Figure 4.4: Detection of First Full Trust Violation
•

Log Path

MATCH path = (h:Label {UID: ‘TS’})-[:INFORMATION FLOW*]->(l:Label {UID:
‘Unclassified’}) WITH relationships(path) AS rels UNWIND rels AS rel with
DISTINCT rel AS rel
RETURN startNODE(rel).UID AS source, endNODE(rel).UID AS destination;

Figure 4.5: Log of First Full Trust Violation
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Second Violation Second violation was identified through a query if a
information flow path exists from DCDC High to DCDC Low. In this case, it involved
all nodes existing within the graph, therefore, the output looks the same as
Figure 4.3 and the path was logged to identify how the violation was produced:
•

Find Path

MATCH path = (:Label {UID: ‘High’})-[:INFORMATION FLOW*]->(:Label {UID:
‘Low’})
RETURN path;
•

Log Path

MATCH path = (h:Label {UID: ‘High’})-[:INFORMATION FLOW*]->(l:Label {UID:
‘Low’}) WITH relationships(path) AS rels UNWIND rels AS rel with DISTINCT rel
AS rel
RETURN startNODE(rel).UID AS source, endNODE(rel).UID AS destination;

Figure 4.6: Log of First Full Trust Violation

Test Scenario (One-Way Partial Trust to Read-Only)
One-way, partial trust (read) relationship was created in the graph
database to depict an incorrect inter-domain relationship (Figure 4.7). However,
the mapping of DCDC Low to DArmy Top Secret provides no concern as DArmy Top
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Secret being able to read from DCDC Low is valid. However, a potential for an
information leak will be observed as DArmy Unclassified is able to read from DCDC
High. As a result of this incorrect mapping:
•

DArmy Unclassif ied is able to read from DCDC High

•

DArmy Top Secret is able to read from DCDC Low
The following Cypher statement was utilized to simulate the inter-domain

relationships and information flows:
•

Incorrectly Map Relationship from DCDC High to DArmy Unclassified

MATCH (d1:Label {UID: ‘High’}), (d2:Label {UID: ’Unclassified’})
CREATE (d1)-[:PARTIALLY TRUSTS ONE WAY READ ONLY]->(d2);
•

Incorrectly Map Relationship from DCDC Low to DArmy Top Secret

MATCH (d1:Label {UID: ‘Low’}), (d2:Label {UID: ‘TS’})
CREATE (d1)-[:PARTIALLY TRUSTS ONE WAY READ ONLY]->(d2);
•

Create Information Flow Between DCDC and DArmy by Utilizing the
Wrong Mapping

MATCH (d1:Label)-[:PARTIALLY TRUSTS ONE WAY READ ONLY]->(d2:Label)
CREATE (d1)-[:INFORMATION FLOW]->(d2);
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Figure 4.7: Multi-Domain One-Way Trust to Read-Only

No Information Leak Detected The MLS policies were not violated within their
domains. However, the MLS policies of D1CDC were not upheld by DArmy. The
lowest security label in DArmy (Unclassified) can obtain classified information from
the highest security label from DCDC (High), the entire DArmy can access classified
information. When a query was utilized to observe all the nodes associated with
the information flow to DArmy Unclassified, it displayed the same graph as Figure
4.7.
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Test Scenario (One-Way Partial Trust to Write-Only)
One-way, partial trust (read) relationship was created in the graph
database to depict an incorrect inter-domain relationship. However, the mapping
of DCDC High to DArmy Unclassifiedprovides no concern as DArmy Unclassified
being able to write to DCDC High is valid. However, a potential for an information
leak will be observed as DArmy Top Secret is able to write to DCDC Low. As a result
of this incorrect mapping:
•

DArmy Unclassi f ied is able to write to DCDC High

•

DArmy Top Secret is able to write to DCDC Low

The following Cypher statement was utilized to simulate the interdomain relationships and information flows:
•

Incorrectly Map Relationship from DCDC High to DArmy Unclassified

MATCH (d1:Label {UID: ‘High’}), (d2:Label {UID: ‘Unclassified’})
CREATE (d1)-[:PARTIALLY TRUSTS ONE WAY WRITE ONLY]->(d2);
•

Incorrectly Map Relationship from DCDC Low to DArmy Top Secret

MATCH (d1:Label {UID: ‘Low’}), (d2:Label {UID: ‘TS’})
CREATE (d1)-[:PARTIALLY TRUSTS ONE WAY WRITE ONLY]->(d2);
•

Create Information Flow Between DCDC and DArmy by Utilizing the
Wrong Mapping

MATCH (d1:Label)-[:PARTIALLY TRUSTS ONE WAY READ ONLY]->(d2:Label)
CREATE (d2)-[:INFORMATION FLOW]->(d1);
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Figure 4.8: Multi-Domain One-Way Trust to Write-Only
No Information Leak Detected The MLS policies were not violated within their
domains. However, the MLS policies of D1Army were not upheld by DCDC. The
lowest security label in DCDC (Low) can obtain classified information from the
highest security label from DCDC (Top Secret), the entire DCDC can access
classified information.
Two-Way Trust
Similar to the one-way trust, there is a two-way trust in which both
domains trust one another. To reduce redundancy, two-way trust will not be
explored in the test. However, the concept will be displayed in a matrix so others
may explore information leaks using the two-way trust concept in the future.
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Similar to Figure 4.2, trust relationships will be marked in black and information
flows will be marked in green.

Figure 4.9: Two-Way Trust Matrix
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CHAPTER FIVE
MLS MULTI-DOMAIN ACCESS CONTROL POLICY

Concept of Controlled Model
Access control between a subject and an object may also be audited by
utilizing the graph database through several methods. In the following case, the
audit protocol makes two assumptions are presumed to be in place when the
audit is taking place:
•

Both parties have agreed upon a terms of trust agreement (e.g., one-way
or two-way trust and partial or full trust)

•

Relationships are mapped correctly - no information leak
From the assumption that the two conditions are met, a scenario with a

skeletal model has been created to conduct the audit. Starting the model
baseline to Figure 4.1, the [:INFORMATION FLOW ] between the security labels
were initially taken out and more details were added for better interpretation as
well as subjects and objects were added as an example in Figure 5.1. In this
scenario, Tom (Resource of DNSA) and Monica (Resource of DArmy) are both
subjects each work for an entity (labeled as “Domain”). In this instance, Tom has
a security level of DNSA High and Monica has a security level of DArmy Secret.
Objects were also added in this scenario, where Foreign Intel File is a resource
of DNSA and Missile File is a resource of the DArmy to see if objects are readable
from a subject from a different domain. The following Cypher statements were
used to create the following model:
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•

Create correct trust mapping between DNSA and DArmy

MATCH (d1: Label {UID: ‘High’}), (d2: Label {UID: ‘TS’})
CREATE (d1)-[:PARTIAL TRUST ONE WAY READ ONLY]->(d2);
MATCH (d1: Label {UID: ‘Low’}), (d2: Label {UID: ‘Unclassified’})
CREATE (d1)-[:PARTIAL TRUST ONE WAY READ ONLY]->(d2);
•

Create domain nodes

CREATE (:Domain {UID: ‘NSA’}), (:Domain {UID: ‘Army’})
•

Attach security labels to domains

MATCH (d:Domain {UID: ‘NSA’}), (l:Label)
WHERE l.UID = “High” OR l.UID= “Low”
MATCH (d:Domain {UID: ‘Army’}), (l:Label)
WHERE l.UID = “TS” OR l.UID = “S” OR l.UID = “Unclassified”
CREATE (d)-[:SECURITY LABEL]->(l);
•

Create subjects Tom and Monica

CREATE (:Subject {UID: ‘Tom’}), (:Subject {UID: ‘Monica’})
•

Create objects Foreign Intel File and Missile File

CREATE (:Object {UID: ‘Foreign Intel File’}), (:Object {UID: ‘Missile File’})
•

Create relationships between subject and objects with other nodes

MATCH (s:Subject {UID: ‘Tom’}), (d:Domain: {UID: ‘NSA’}), (l: Label {UID:
‘High’}
CREATE (s)-[:RESOURCE OF]->(d), (s)-[:SECURITY LEVEL]->(l);
MATCH (s:Subject {UID: ‘Monica’}), (d:Domain: {UID: ‘Army’}), (l: Label {UID:
‘S’}
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CREATE (s)-[:RESOURCE OF]->(d), (s)-[:SECURITY LEVEL]->(l);
MATCH (s:Object {UID: ‘Foreign Intel File’}), (d:Domain: {UID: ‘NSA’}), (l: Label
{UID: ‘Low’}
CREATE (s)-[:RESOURCE OF]->(d), (s)-[:SECURITY LEVEL]->(l);
MATCH (s:Object {UID: ‘Missile File’}), (d:Domain: {UID: ‘Army’}), (l: Label {UID:
‘S’}
CREATE (s)-[:RESOURCE OF]->(d), (s)-[:SECURITY LEVEL]->(l);

Figure 5.1: Skeletal Model of Scenario
Substituting Relationships
As mentioned in the previous chapter, DOMINATES and trust relationship
may be substituted accordingly without violating the BLP security principles as
the INFORMATION FLOW in the database. As a result, the DOMINATES and
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PARTIAL TRUST relationship was substituted as shown in Figure 5.1 while
subjects, objects, and domain maintain their relationships in the database.
•

Create information flow accordingly with partial trust relationship,
while also deleting the partial trust relationship

MATCH (d1:Label)-[rel:PARTIAL TRUST ONE WAY READ ONLY]->(d2:Label)
CREATE (d1)-[:INFORMATION FLOW]->(d2)
DETACH DELETE rel;
•

Create information flow accordingly with dominates relationship,
while also deleting the dominates relationship

MATCH (h:Label)-[rel:DOMINATES]->(l:Label)
CREATE (l)-[:INFORMATION FLOW]->(h)
DETACH DELETE rel;

Figure 5.2: Model of Scenario
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Query of Access Control Policy
There are two scenarios generated with this model. The first scenario will
prove that a query is possible for one subject to access another object in an interdomain setting. The second scenario is generated to prove that the integrity of
the overall access control policy is maintained in the graph database.

Scenario 1 In this scenario, a situation arises where information contained in a
file from the National Security Agency was compromised and an internal audit
has proven it was not compromised from a subject within the same domain; but
there is a suspicion that Monica from the Army might be behind the leak. The
question is “Is it possible for Monica (DArmy) to read the Foreign Intel File (DNSA)?”
This question can be directly queried in the graph database. As shown in Figure
5.3, Information was able to flow from DNSA Low, which was the Foreign Missile
File’s security label, to Unclassified (DArmy)and from Unclassified (DArmy) to Secret
(DArmy), which is a security clearance Monica has.
•

Querying the suspect

MATCH clearance = (s:Subject {UID: ‘Monica’})-[rel:SECURITY LEVEL]>(sl1:Label), classification = (o:Object {UID: ‘Foreign Intel File’})-[:SECURITY
LEVEL]->(sl2:Label), path = (sl2)-[:INFORMATION FLOW*]->(sl1)
RETURN clearance, classification, path;
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Figure 5.3: Successful Query

Scenario 2 Continuing the scenario story line from scenario 1, Army also found
their confidential missile file (DArmy) in the public. The only internal suspect is
Monica (DArmy),however, if the Army wanted to rule out the fact it might have
been leaked through subject Tom from the National Security Agency, it can ask
the database a similar question, “Is it possible for Tom (DNSA) to read the Foreign
Intel File (DArmy)?”. However, in this case, there is no path for Army’s confidential
files to reach the NSA domain since there was only a one-way read agreement,
thus maintaining the integrity of the agreement intact.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION AND AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDIES

Conclusion
Graph databases may be utilized to implement, monitor, and audit MLS
policies from a single domain to multi-domains. This conclusion was reached
after leveraging Bell-LaPadula’s security principles and trust relationships with
the flow of information within the lattice structure. Not only can the database
detect errors in the implemented policy, but can also give researchers the ability
to log the path it took to reach a certain end point to rectify the modeling problem
or an agreement that the policy writer made. Modeling the MLS policies in the
database can provide a means to formalize written security policies.
Future Work
According to Needham and Hodler, 2019, three algorithms can be
explored in a graph database: path finding, centrality, and community detection
algorithms. Out of the three algorithms mentioned, centrality algorithm may be
one of the most useful algorithms that can be explored in a graph database for
security purposes. The variety of centrality algorithm may be explored to detect
the most critical nodes in respect to MLS policy or networked systems. As a
result, officials responsible for the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
information may be able to allocate proper amount of finite resources to
safeguard the systems or information.
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Furthermore, there may be work to be done on path finding algorithm.
Path finding algorithm could not be utilized properly in this thesis due to not
having any numerical values on the relationship. When there is a “cost” assigned
to a relationship between several nodes, path finding algorithm may be able to
calculate the shortest path to get to a certain resource and save time and
resource for a subject on a domain. For example, there are many paths a subject
in T S {Bio, Nuke} can read the resources in S {} in Figure 3.7, however, it is not
certain all those paths are efficient. Therefore, path finding algorithm may provide
some assistance in designing an efficient MLS policy.

Figure 6.1: Reference of Figure 4.3
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Another future work that may be done is on the analysis of the two-way
trust mechanism. Although the concept is similar between a one-way trust
agreement, two-way trust far complicates and makes the information flow much
more intricate. The graph database may be able to help detect errors from
implementing MLS policies that may have been proven to be viable.
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